The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters
Volume 36
Number 1 Parameters Spring 2006

Article 8

3-1-2006

Rehabilitating a Rogue: Libya’s WMD Reversal and Lessons for US
Policy
Dafna Hochman

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters

Recommended Citation
Dafna Hochman, "Rehabilitating a Rogue: Libya’s WMD Reversal and Lessons for US Policy," Parameters
36, no. 1 (2006), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.2292.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The
US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.

Rehabilitating a Rogue:
Libya’s WMD Reversal and
Lessons for US Policy
DAFNA HOCHMAN
© 2006 Dafna Hochman

O

n 19 December 2003, Muammar al-Qadhafi announced Libya’s decision to dismantle all components of its nonconventional weapons programs. Concurrently, Qadhafi declared an abrupt halt to Libya’s development
of missiles with a range exceeding 300 kilometers and his intent to open all
nonconventional weapons stockpiles and research programs to international
inspectors.1 Libya’s acknowledgment that it was building chemical and biological, as well as nuclear, weapons marked a dramatic shift; for decades, Tripoli had unequivocally denied the possession of any such weapons when
faced with Western allegations to that effect. In fact, as recently as January
2003, Qadhafi told an American reporter that it was “crazy to think that
Libya” had weapons of mass destruction (WMD).2 In a 2003 article directed
at the US foreign policy community, Qadhafi’s son and likely successor, Saif
al-Islam al-Qadhafi, underscored Libya’s continued compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) as well as the Biological Weapons Convention.3
Yet, with great confessional drama, Qadhafi now admitted to the international community that he had overseen the development of an active
WMD program, with materials imported as recently as 2001. Thus, Qadhafi’s
WMD reversal poses a puzzling question: Why would a rogue leader decide
to eliminate a WMD program that he recently had been pursuing?
The international community, including President George W. Bush
and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, immediately lauded Qadhafi’s decision
to seek rapprochement with the West.4 The Bush Administration and analysts
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outside the US government cited two principal reasons behind Qadhafi’s decision. First, they argued that the United States had sent a strong message by invading Iraq in 2003, proving its willingness to use military force to deal with
rogue states acquiring WMD. Libya must have been watching, they contended.
Second, many argued that economic sanctions had successfully suppressed the
Libyan economy. With a growing population, and potential revenue from undeveloped oil resources, Qadhafi might have decided to prioritize Libya’s economic survival over WMD procurement.5
These two explanations, while plausible, have sidelined the role of
deliberate, long-term US policies toward Libya that likely facilitated Qadhafi’s
WMD reversal. Three additional factors affected Libya’s WMD reversal. First,
in addition to the pressures exerted by the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Qadhafi
had reason to foresee greater security benefits to be gained by closer ties with
the United States and the West. In particular, Libya’s concern about al Qaeda
influenced its desire to ally with the United States. Second, while seeking an
end to the stifling US and UN sanctions for economic motives, Qadhafi also
sought to end Libya’s pariah status. Qadhafi’s concern about his own reputation and Libya’s international image and credibility motivated his decision.
Third, the Pam Am 103 victims’ families and their advocates on Capitol Hill
wielded agenda-setting influence, strengthening the negotiating position of the
United States vis-à-vis Libya. Each of these factors reflects one of three US
foreign policy approaches applied toward Libya over the past 15 years. Each
factor also yields implications for current and future US national security strategies, offering prescriptive lessons to policymakers confronting rogue regimes
acquiring WMD programs.
Since 1969, when Qadhafi and his revolutionary guard staged a military coup against the US-backed King Idris, US-Libyan bilateral relations
have vacillated between tense and nonexistent. Among the many contentious
issues that have shaped US policy toward Libya in the past two decades, however, this article specifically focuses on the problem posed by the Libyan
WMD arsenal and Qadhafi’s decision to dismantle it. Of course, US security
concerns are always interconnected; Libyan WMD proliferation is linked intricately to the country’s support for terrorism, Libya’s oil supply, inter-Arab
relations, international trade, and other geostrategic issues. Furthermore,
while the article focuses on the ramifications of three US foreign policy apDafna Hochman, a Ph.D. student in political science at Columbia University, is a
former foreign policy and defense advisor with the US Senate. She has published on US
foreign policy in the Middle East in the Chicago Tribune, Newsday, the International
Herald Tribune, and the Harvard Kennedy School of Government working paper series.

64

Parameters

proaches applied toward Libya, it does not address the use of US military
force against Libya. This might seem strange, given that many Americans
first learned about Qadhafi in the early 1980s. During that time, the Reagan
Administration ordered a series of military attacks on Tripoli and Bengazi in
response to Libyan terrorist plots. The United States has not chosen to exercise the military option against Libya since 1986, however. The article also
focuses only on the policies toward Libya enacted by the Clinton and George
W. Bush administrations. These policies most directly laid the groundwork
for Qadhafi’s December 2003 announcement.

Assessing Libya’s Security Interests
Analyzing Qadhafi’s decisionmaking through a security lens requires
assessing Libya’s relative capabilities, particular the extent of Libya’s nonconventional weapons research and development programs. Prior to Qadhafi’s
2003 announcement, outside experts and officials within both the Clinton and
George W. Bush administrations disagreed internally about the size of Libya’s
arsenal.6 When International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and US inspectors entered Libya in January 2004, they found that Libya possessed more
extensive nuclear and chemical weapons parts than previously presumed. Inspectors found approximately 23 tons of mustard agents in one chemical weapons production facility and thousands of unfilled munitions.7 Libya admitted to
the IAEA in 2004 that it had acquired 20 preassembled P-1 centrifuges and the
components for another 200; it also had constructed enrichment cascades.8
Qadhafi also confessed that, in 2000, Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan
had assisted with the centrifuge enrichment program and had provided Libya
with an actual nuclear weapon design.9 All of this nuclear weapon activity violated Libya’s obligations under the NPT, which it ratified and signed in 1975.
Thus far, US and United Kingdom officials have found no evidence of a Libyan
biological weapons program.
The significance of Qadhafi’s 2003 decision becomes all the more
enigmatic—and important to study—when it becomes apparent that the
scope of Libya’s WMD arsenal was significant, modernized, and certainly
larger than some experts expected it to be. Qadhafi must have foreseen tangible benefits of international rapprochement in order to willingly disarm a
recently modernized WMD program. Assuming that Libyan security was
Qadhafi’s central goal, Qadhafi’s willingness to weaken state power by disposing of his nonconventional weapons poses a counter-intuitive enigma.
One explanation is that Libya perceived greater danger in maintaining its nuclear and chemical programs than in destroying them. Indeed, those who argue that the 2003 Iraq war forced Qadhafi’s hand assume that Libya must
have worried that retaining its weapons programs would invite US military
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action. But the 2003 Iraq war need not have been the sole factor shaping Libya’s security reconsiderations.
It is not surprising that many consider the defeat of Saddam Hussein
and his regime an influential factor in Libya’s decision, given the political expediency of this contention. Arms control experts inside and outside of the
government argue that the demonstration of US power—combined with US
intolerance for Saddam’s evasion of sanctions—demonstrated to other rogue
states that the global superpower would rely on tactics as extreme as regime
change to punish WMD proliferators. The Bush Administration highlighted
this particular argument in its explanation of Libya’s disarmament decision,
arguing that the Iraq war had established a “punitive model,” one that would
induce other states to give up their WMD programs.10
Yet two major factual points challenge the contention that Libya’s
decision to disarm resulted from security considerations triggered by the
2003 Iraq war. First, Libya was not the only rogue regime attempting to acquire WMD in 2003. The “Iraq-war-as-punitive model” suggests that the Iranian and North Korean regimes would feel as threatened as Libya did. Yet
Iran and North Korea, according to most analysts’ estimates, reacted to the
US confrontation with Iraq by accelerating their development of nuclear
weapons. Syria, Sudan, and other states of concern also do not seem to be following Libya’s lead, neither contemplating WMD disarmament nor seeking
rapprochement with the United States. Of course, the Iraq war could still have
played a role in Libya’s decision to disarm even if other rogue states did not
imitate its WMD reversal.
Second, and perhaps more telling, the chronology of US-Libya bilateral negotiations calls into question the importance of the 2003 Iraq war in
shaping Libyan behavior. As will be discussed in subsequent sections, Libya
first expressed interest in disarming in the mid-1990s. In 1997, for instance,
the Clinton Administration successfully negotiated with Libya to destroy its
chemical weapons plant in Tarhunah.11 In 1999, according to multiple accounts by Clinton Administration officials, Libyan representatives offered to
surrender WMD programs during secret negotiations with their US counterparts, including a formal offer by Qadhafi of rapprochement.12 Nearly four
years before the United States toppled Saddam’s regime, therefore, the Libyans expressed willingness to discuss disarmament with the United States.
Finally, Bush Administration officials have stated that before March 2003,
Libyan officials had approached British and US officials and offered to begin
negotiating a disarmament plan. Though US intentions to invade Iraq were
clear by March 2003, the outcome—Saddam’s defeat—was not. Thus, this
chronology undermines the argument of those who would solely attribute
Qadhafi’s decision to the Iraq war’s deterrent effect.
66
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Additional security imperatives beyond the Iraq war likely influenced
Libya’s decision to disarm. Libya might have believed that closer relations to
the United States could mitigate other threats, perhaps threats more dangerous
to Libya than the loss of its WMD programs. In particular, even before 11 September 2001, Qadhafi had begun offering to cooperate with US officials in
fighting al Qaeda cells in North Africa.13 Libya has been at war with al Qaeda
and its affiliates since at least the 1996 assassination attempt against Qadhafi
by the militant Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Shortly thereafter, Tripoli insisted that al Qaeda had inspired and financed the LIFG plot.14 Qadhafi
perhaps believed that renewed diplomatic ties with the United States would
allow Libya to bandwagon onto the US-led Global War on Terrorism, seeking
defense from al Qaeda. Alliance-formation with the United States was an enticing security objective that likely motivated Libya’s decision. WMD disarmament became a means to facilitate this alliance.15 Indeed, exactly a year after
Qadhafi’s reversal, in December 2004, the United States designated the LIFG
as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.16
Moreover, the economic benefits of disarmament offered possible
security gains to Libya. Qadhafi likely calculated the potential revenue to
be gained from lifting both UN and US sanctions—from the influx of foreign
direct investments and capital and from new international loans. This new
revenue, when invested in Libya’s vast oil industry, could be used to shore
up Libya’s conventional arsenal even as Tripoli comprehensively complied
with its nonconventional disarmament. Economic development and growth
can contribute to security, as increased state revenues enable new arms
purchases. Therefore, even if Qadhafi was primarily motivated by security
concerns, eliminating economic sanctions could have been a means of augmenting Libya’s military power. We will soon see whether this prediction
comes to fruition, if Libya chooses to spend its new revenue on its military.
Thus, the US war in Iraq need not have been Libya’s sole security consideration or motivation. Rather, Libya likely conducted a cost-benefit analysis of its security situation and concluded that disarming enabled multiple
security gains. On balance, these outweighed the costs of destroying Qadhafi’s
WMD arsenal.

The Power of International Opprobrium
The second most common explanation offered in the wake of Qadhafi’s 2003 reversal focused on Libya’s material interests. Both US and UN
economic sanctions, imposed for almost two decades, had effectively isolated Libya from international trade and investment and successfully created economic incentives to disarm. Both sets of sanctions prevented Libya
from importing the latest oilfield technology, making it impossible for QadSpring 2006
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hafi to expand Libya’s oil production. Some estimated that the sanctions
cost Libya over $30 billion in revenue.17 Observers within the Bush Administration and experts in the private sector contended that Qadhafi finally acknowledged Libya’s plummeting economy and sought to realize Libya’s
vast oil potential. Faced with a growing population and the failure of the
state-run economy, Qadhafi recognized that the only solution to Libya’s
poverty was to open up Libya to international trade and investment. Indeed,
evidence does suggest that Qadhafi, or at least his top advisors, understood
Libya’s predicament and chose to privilege economic interests over ideological or nationalist ones.18 Qadhafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, a doctoral student
at the London School of Economics, has been particularly vocal about the
need for Libya to embrace global capital and abandon its long-standing socialist economic policies.
Since 2003, speeches by Libya’s prime minister and other officials
suggest that the material incentives of lifting sanctions played a large role
in Qadhafi’s decisionmaking.19 But the sanctions, imposed by global institutions, also generated nonmaterial incentives to disarm, particularly international opprobrium of Libyan behavior. As a result, Qadhafi sought to
improve his image and that of his country on the national stage. He has long
considered himself to be a charismatic leader of the developing world. By
the late 1990s, however, Libya’s deep international isolation had undercut
Qadhafi’s attempts to exert influence on both African politics and intraArab affairs.
Qadhafi has long believed that his unique blend of Marxist-Islamist
revolutionary ideology, as well as his own model of revolution, should inspire
similar revolutions throughout the developing world. After successfully
leading the Libyan revolution of 1969, Qadhafi, in his “Green Book,” called
his revolution universal, based on “an international ideology, not a national
one” and not “on [a specific] religion and nationalism, [but on] any religion
and nationalism.”20 Moreover, Qadhafi attempted to export some of his revolutionary ideals, offering public support to revolutionaries such as Fidel Castro and Nelson Mandela. His lengthy speeches, fixtures since the late 1960s,
exalted Libya as a model political system, one that would “bring salvation to
the world.”21 In the wake of Qadhafi’s dramatic 2003 reversal, his mouthpieces, the al-Jamahiriyya and al-Shams newspapers, echoed his typical
bombastic style. They proclaimed that by making such a courageous decision, Libya would serve as a role model that would be emulated by great and
small powers alike, in order to bring about a more civilized world free of the
threat of WMD.22
Currently, Qadhafi’s desire to assume the role of charismatic revolutionary manifests itself through his attempts to play a high-profile leadership
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“Qadhafi’s willingness to weaken state power by
disposing of his nonconventional weapons
poses a counter-intuitive enigma.”

role within sub-Saharan Africa, where Libya continues to gain influence
through financial and material beneficence. In 2002-2003, much to the dismay of the international human rights community, Qadhafi bullied the African members of the UN’s Commission on Human Rights and convinced them
to select Libya to represent the African region, whose turn it was to chair that
year’s commission.23 Qadhafi’s petition of the African caucus to nominate his
country to chair the UN’s premier human rights organization (in addition to
being a tragic comedy) reflects his ambitions for regional African leadership.
Qadhafi’s recent (and heretofore unsuccessful) efforts to mediate over the
crisis in Darfur also exemplify these ambitions.24 Libya’s efforts to secure a
leadership role in African affairs provide salient examples of Qadhafi’s selfimage as a charismatic political leader of the developing world.
Moreover, Libya is currently petitioning the US government to eliminate Libya’s name from the US State Department’s list of state sponsors of
terrorism.25 President Bush’s executive order of 20 September 2004 formally
lifted almost all previous orders establishing sanctions with respect to Libya.
It did, however, maintain three residual sanctions imposed on Libya because
of its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.26 Yet these additional designations are economically insignificant. With the major economic sanctions
already lifted, US companies have established Tripoli offices with great celerity. Nonetheless, though the Bush Administration lifted nearly all of the
measurable sanctions over the course of only nine months (December 2003 to
August 2004), Libya remains dissatisfied. Qadhafi’s public statements and
press accounts reflect his discontent that Libya remains on a list alongside
states such as Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Sudan, and Syria.27 Qadhafi does not
like being associated with this group because of his sensitivity to Libya’s image in the international community.
Finally, Qadhafi likely took international norms into consideration,
especially counterproliferation taboos against WMD. Either these norms compelled a change in Qadhafi’s behavior or he strategically realized that defying
these norms could be self-defeating. A careful analysis of Qadhafi’s language
in his December 2003 announcement and further speeches and public stateSpring 2006
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ments explaining his decision reveals repeated references to international
nonproliferation agreements. Qadhafi deliberately couched his decision to disarm in the norms of international WMD agreements and institutions. For example, the actual statement released by the Libyan Foreign Ministry on 19
December 2003 included a list of international conventions to which Libya
promised to commit:
Libya has decided to limit its missile activities to missiles with a range consistent
with that agreed under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). . . .
Libya wishes to reaffirm that it considers itself bound by the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Agreement on Safeguards, the IAEA and
the Convention on Biological Weapons and that it accepts any other commitment, including the Additional Protocol to the IAEA, Safeguard Agreement, the
Chemical Weapons convention, and the Biological Weapons convention.28

Qadhafi, ever concerned about image, wished his WMD disarmament
to be perceived as an international endeavor, conducted through multilateral
institutions such as the IAEA. Clearly, he wanted to avoid the impression that
he surrendered to US bilateral pressure to disarm. In March 2004, Qadhafi displayed this deep concern about Libya’s image. When the press reported that US
ships taking away Tripoli’s nuclear materials and equipment had publicly displayed the confiscated materials on deck, the Libyan government took offense.
On 16 March 2004, a senior Libyan official registered this displeasure with the
US government’s display of Libya’s former WMD materials: “Libya was quite
unhappy with this dog-and-pony show because it hurts [Libya] domestically
(and) in the Arab world. . . . It makes [Libya’s disarmament] look like unilateral
US disarmament of Libya, and [instead] Libya wants it recognized as disarmament under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and IAEA auspices.”29
These statements by Libyan officials explaining the WMD reversal indicate
that Qadhafi intended to create the impression that the destruction of his arsenal was being done in conjunction with international procedures and norms,
rather than as a concession to the United States.
During his first meeting with European Commission officials since
his December 2003 announcement, Qadhafi expressed hope that Libya would
become an example to other countries, encouraging other states to disarm:
“Libya, which was in the lead and led the liberation movement in the Third
World and Africa, now has decided to lead the peace movement all over the
world.” In typical fashion, Qadhafi does not fail to claim credit, adding: “The
first step was taken voluntarily, out of [my] own will and volition, to discard
all weapons of mass destruction programs.”30 Since December 2003, Qadhafi
has been increasingly vocal about the need for international arms control regimes and international cooperation to fight terrorism. While these public
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statements could very well be insincere, it is worth noting that a public leader
successfully isolated by international institutions and regimes is now championing these very mechanisms en route to a restored public image. He has,
ironically, become a spokesperson for the very norms and proliferation
agreements that he audaciously violated for more than two decades.

Powerful Domestic “Constraints”
While the first two factors outlined above involved changing Libyan
foreign policy calculations, a third factor, an element of US foreign policy,
also influenced Qadhafi’s decisionmaking. The US government must often
reconcile obligations to domestic interest groups with the demands of international relations. The executive branch faced this balancing role throughout
the decade-long negotiations with Libya that preceded Qadhafi’s December
2003 reversal.31 The tragedy of the Pan Am 103 bombing over Lockerbie,
Scotland, in December 1988 and the activism of the American victims’ families in the aftermath played a central role in US foreign policy toward Libya.
Subsequently, the centrality of the Pan Am 103 matter became an important
bargaining asset for the United States during its negotiations with Libya regarding its WMD programs.
The bomb aboard Pan Am 103 killed 270 people when it exploded
over Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988. This act of terror produced the
highest American death toll (189) of any terrorist attack in history before
9/11. A joint American-British investigatory commission, which published
its findings in November 1991, pointed to Libya as the party directly responsible for the Pan Am 103 attack. Shortly after the tragedy, the families of these
189 victims emerged as powerful voices shaping US policy toward Libya, the
Middle East, and counterterrorism. Having found sympathetic allies on
Capitol Hill, they remain active and influential today.32 These families, for
example, successfully petitioned the White House to establish the Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism in 1989, and the commission’s recommendations were largely implemented. In 1995, the family members
successfully petitioned Congress to add Libya to a sanction bill initially intended only to strengthen US sanctions against Iran through penalties to
non-American companies. The bill subsequently became known as the Iran
and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA).
Therefore, it is not surprising that resolving the issues surrounding
the Pan Am 103 terrorist attack significantly influenced US (and UK) policy
toward Libya for much of the 1990s. The states of origin of most of the Pan
Am 103 victims—the United States, Britain, and France—ensured the passage of three UN Security Council Resolutions, 731 (1992), 748 (1992), and
883 (1993). The three resolutions instructed Libya to: disclose all that it knew
Spring 2006
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about the Pan Am 103 attacks; accept the role of Libyan officials in the
Lockerbie bombing; formally renounce terrorism; and pay compensation to
the families of the Lockerbie victims.33 The United Nations suspended sanctions in 1999 when Libya handed over government agents connected to the
Pan Am 103 bombings. The US government immediately expressed opposition to the suspension, insisting that the multilateral sanctions should not be
lifted until Tripoli had fulfilled all four of the UN resolutions’ requirements.
Libya’s fulfillment of these four imperatives also became the necessary prerequisite action for any Libyan dialogue with the United States.
The powerful influence of the Pan Am 103 family members highlights the role of pressures exerted by domestic actors in shaping US foreign
policy. Scholars have argued that the greater the domestic constraints imposed on a government negotiator, the stronger his or her bargaining position
and negotiating leverage on the international level. Indeed, the resolute red
lines insisted on by the Pan Am 103 families strengthened the US negotiators’
positions. During Libyan-US negotiations in 1992 and 1999, the Libyans offered to meet some of the US demands regarding transnational issues, including a reduction, however symbolic, of its WMD programs. But these Libyan
advances were rejected by the US Administration on the grounds that the Libyan government had not yet fully resolved all four of the requirements of the
UN Security Council resolutions. Ultimately, the Libyans offered a much
more comprehensive disarmament concession in 2003.
According to former US Senator Gary Hart, the head of the Libyan
intelligence services approached him in 1992 and offered to turn over the two
Pam Am bombing suspects, later identified as Abdel Basset Ali Megrahi and
Lamen Khalifa Fhimah. In exchange, Libya wanted a commitment from the
George H. W. Bush Administration that preliminary discussions would begin
regarding the lifting of sanctions and eventual normalization of US-Libyan
relations. According to Hart’s account, the State Department rejected any
possibility of dialogue, insisting that no negotiations would occur until Libya
showed proof of complying with the UN resolutions.34 In other words, the UN
demands were not part of the negotiations themselves, but rather a prerequisite Libya had to fulfill to earn a place at the negotiating table.
President Clinton’s 1998 statement of his Administration’s policy
toward Libya underscored that the resolution of the Pan Am 103 issues remained the top priority in US-Libyan relations.35 A year later, Libyan officials
held secret discussions with Clinton Administration officials to convey
Qadhafi’s interest in normalizing relations. The Clinton White House again
stated that no movement toward better relations was possible until Libya met
its responsibilities stemming from the Pan Am 103 tragedy.36 According to
then-Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Martin Indyk,37 al72
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though the Libyans offered to negotiate eliminating their WMD programs in
1999, at that time the Administration was much more interested in securing
compensation for the Pan Am 103 families. Indyk recounts:
In October 1999, Libya repeated its offer on chemical weapons and agreed to
join the Middle East multilateral arms control talks taking place at the time.
Why did we not pursue the Libyan WMD offer then? Because resolving the Pan
Am 103 issues was our condition for any further engagement.38

The record reflects that the US refusal to negotiate with Libya over its
WMD in 1999 subsequently strengthened America’s bargaining hand. Shortly
thereafter, Qadhafi handed over to a Scottish court the wanted Libyan suspects
who had allegedly plotted the Pan Am 103 attack, where one was convicted and
one was acquitted. This occurred without any US concessions. Furthermore, in
1999, Libya’s offers regarding its WMD were somewhat limited—a promise to
join the Chemical Weapons Convention and to open up its facilities to inspectors. Libya also expressed a strong preference for a multilateral forum to discuss its WMD status, rather than bilateral talks with the United States or the
United Kingdom. While these offers are important, they are insignificant compared to Libya’s far-reaching, comprehensive WMD disarmament of 2003.
Driving a hard bargain in 1999 successfully upped the ante: Libya realized that
window-dressing counterproliferation promises would not suffice. The Clinton Administration’s resolve not to concede in 1999 until the Pan Am 103
issues had been satisfactorily addressed prompted Libya to offer more comprehensive concessions regarding its WMD in 2003.
While US negotiators in 1999 might have felt conflicted about relinquishing the chance to facilitate Libyan disarmament, ultimately their fealty
to the concerns of the Pan Am 103 families positioned the United States to
achieve greater concessions from Qadhafi four years later. As the Libyan example suggests, US foreign policy goals involving negotiations can be both
shaped and enhanced by attending to domestic interests.

Implications for Policymakers
Thus, three causal factors, usually under-acknowledged in assessments of Qadhafi’s decisionmaking, together contributed to Qadhafi’s WMD
reversal. It is difficult to impute relative causation without full access to Libyan
government documents. Yet, based on the available evidence, these factors
must be considered in analyzing Qadhafi’s reversal, along with the prevalent
explanations focusing on the Iraq war’s effect and Libya’s economic motivations. These three causal factors loosely correlate with three different US foreign policy approaches that American officials mobilized to encourage Libya
to disarm. First, US policymakers understood Libya’s security calculations, esSpring 2006
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pecially its concern about al Qaeda. Second, they exploited Qadhafi’s obsession with his reputation through “naming and shaming” techniques. Third,
they allowed a domestic group’s interests to enhance US negotiating positions
with Libya.
Disaggregating the approaches that cumulatively led to Libya’s reversal yields important implications for future US security policy toward
rogue regimes possessing or attempting to acquire WMD. First, a security
analysis suggests that Qadhafi conducted cost-benefit security calculations
and concluded that destroying his WMD made security sense. Whether or not
the US invasion of Iraq played a dominant role in his cost-benefit analysis,
Qadhafi conceived of his WMD reversal as an act of realpolitik. Debating the
efficacy of the punitive model of the Iraq war is fruitless, as it is highly unlikely that future US foreign policymakers will order military force against
one rogue regime simply to threaten or scare another one into disarmament.
Nonetheless, rogue regimes choosing to disarm after making serious security
calculations might be motivated by multiple causes. These catalysts include
fear of an attack by a threatening hegemon, a desire to advance unrelated security goals by bandwagoning, pursuit of revenue to buy conventional weapons, or a recognition that their WMD arsenals are relatively inferior and
therefore will never sufficiently threaten their adversaries. Regardless of
the specific incentive and the specific cost-benefit analysis of security gains,
the bottom line remains: WMD disarmament can be security-enhancing in
the eyes of a rogue state leader. Giving rogues security carrots to disarm,
therefore, is a useful strategy. Moreover, US foreign policy decisionmakers
need to take into account that rogues with WMD, such as Iran and North
Korea, do actually conceive of their WMD arsenals in defensive security
terms, even if their articulation of the threats they feel seem specious to an
American audience.
Second, international institutions and regimes such as economic
sanctions can exert nonmaterial as well as material incentives and pressures.
Materially, economic sanctions work most effectively when they are truly
multilateral. In the case of Libya, for more than 15 years United Nations sanctions received wide international backing. As a result, Libya needed to confront and conduct dialogue with a range of foreign countries in order to
eliminate the sanctions. Sanctions and IAEA inspections that are respected by
some great powers while halfheartedly regarded by others do little to influence rogue behavior. This lesson regarding the power of international consensus is critical to confronting Iran and North Korea.
In terms of nonmaterial incentives, the case of Libya suggests that
the norms bound up in international institutions are sometimes ignored and at
other times effective. On one hand, Libya’s record of violating nonprolifera74
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“Additional security imperatives beyond
the Iraq war likely affected Libya’s
decision to disarm.”

tion agreements suggests that US foreign policymakers should review the
various international nonproliferation treaties and conventions such as the
chemical and biological weapons conventions, the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the Missile Technology
Control Regime. Libya’s intent to acquire WMD materials in violation of its
treaty obligations clearly demonstrates how counterproliferation regimes,
especially treaties with few means of enforcement, can do little to stop rogues
intent on abusing them. The fact that NPT signatories such as Libya are not
only investing and dealing in nuclear materials on the international black
market but also tend to lie about their WMD arsenal calls into question the efficacy of these treaties. Moreover, the debate among US policymakers and
arms control experts regarding the uncertain size of Libya’s armament program raises concern about the intelligence community’s precise knowledge
of the scope of rogue regimes’ WMD arsenals. Finally, the revelations by
Libya about Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan’s extensive smuggling ring should
serve as a warning to US foreign policymakers. Current counterproliferation
mechanisms are insufficient. These regimes—as well as international inspections and intelligence gathering—need to be updated to reflect the new role of
renegade actors willing to participate in WMD smuggling. These unitary actors, from disgruntled Russian scientists to high-level figures such as Khan,
might smuggle or sell dangerous materials in spite of their country’s best intent to abide by international nonproliferation agreements.
On the other hand, international norms regarding WMD are important mechanisms, capable of encouraging rogues to disarm and to cooperate.
Norms can both pressure rogue leaders to reform and provide a road map for
rehabilitation. US policies aimed at isolating Libya, applied from the 1980s
through 2003, successfully exploited Qadhafi’s concern for his international
image. Placing Libya on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism effectively constrained Qadhafi’s ambitions—not only due to the material consequences of being placed on this list but also because such overt
censure undermined his global standing. Ultimately, US policies that publicly critique the nature of a regime—“naming and shaming” strategies—can
Spring 2006
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be effective, especially if the condemnation is accompanied by international
consensus. Attacking a rogue state’s reputation is likely to be less effective
without such consensus.
Moreover, when Qadhafi finally did decide to disarm, the prevailing
global denunciation of illegal WMD possession allowed him to pitch his 19
December 2003 decision as a positive, progressive act. In announcing his
reversal, Qadhafi did not need to appear as if he was buckling under US pressure. Because of scant press coverage of the actual US-Libyan talks that preceded Qadhafi’s December 2003 reversal, he was able to use the language of
international norms to spin his WMD disarmament as a heroic act of international cooperation. The fact that Libya continues to preach to other developing world leaders about the “dangers” of nuclear and other nonconventional
weapons reflects the strength of the normative international discourse impugning WMD acquisition.
Third, an analysis of domestic interests reveals the powerful influences of an organized domestic lobbying group concerned with one particular
US foreign policy. The Pan Am 103 families unquestionably shaped the course
of US-Libyan bilateral relations and the timeline for rapprochement. Although
in the case of North Korea, Iran, and Syria, similar domestic groups do not
exist, the lesson that domestic lobbies pose constraints is especially relevant
after 9/11. A new, powerful domestic lobby—the 9/11 families—has already
changed domestic law and is currently involved in lawsuits against Saudi Arabia and in other counter-terrorism lobbying activities. The victims of a tragedy
wield effective influence in our foreign policy bureaucracy, particularly if they
ally with powerful legislators. In confronting other rogues such as Iran, US foreign policymakers sometimes contend with the families of US victims of
Hezbollah or the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. (Both groups receive Iranian backing.) Given the continuous nature of the war on terrorism, there will likely be
more American victims. If a future attack is connected to Iran, or if North Korea is found selling WMD materials to al Qaeda operatives, domestic pressures
to confront the threat of rogues and their arsenals will likely intensify.
Each of these causal factors influencing Qadhafi’s decisionmaking
has been loosely incorporated into a US foreign policy approach applied
toward Libya over the past 15 years. In the short term, two specific, more immediate “triggers” probably contributed to the timing of Qadhafi’s announcement. First, in early October 2003, the United States allegedly intercepted an
illegal shipment of thousands of parts of uranium-enrichment equipment
bound for Libya. While Libyan officials already had approached Bush Administration officials six months earlier about Qadhafi’s intent to disarm, the seizure in early October likely sealed his decision to dismantle his nuclear
weapons program. Being caught red-handed seemed to have expedited Qad76
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hafi’s willingness to disarm and might have hastened the 19 December 2003
announcement.39 Second, Qadhafi’s concern about his succession probably influenced the timing of his decision. By all accounts, Qadhafi is grooming his
son, Saif al-Islam, to replace him. Saif al-Islam might have urged his father to
issue the disarmament decision as soon as possible, as Saif al-Islam himself has
been a strong proponent of dialogue with the United States and the West.
While the above triggers are notable, they expedited an already ongoing process. The gradual rehabilitation of Qadhafi resulted from varied,
long-term US foreign policy approaches. Ultimately, there is no clear formula
prescribing the rehabilitation of rogues or a clear roadmap to generate voluntary disarmament. The Libyan reversal suggests that US policymakers should
be mindful to appeal to a diverse array of possible approaches as a necessary,
though not sufficient, first step.
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